![[personal profile]](https://www.dreamwidth.org/img/silk/identity/user.png){kind=small}
Nov. 2nd, 2008
Earlier tonight, I put a challenge, various places: Modal moral theorists, I have for you the following challenge: Prove that Ought does not imply Can.
I did this, because I couldn't see a scenario in which what I tell someone they "ought" to do wouldn't be something they "could" do, and have it make any damn sense, and I wanted to see if someone could prove me wrong. So I talked to two people who I knew would have Very different ideas on the question, and got two very different conversations from it.
( Sundays With Mendori )
And, Concurrently:
( Coyote Talk )
So, if you don't want to read all of that: I have seen both that I'm looking at it too narrowly, and that I can make a lateral move.
If the "Ought/Can" relationship is a contextual and compartmental modality, meaning that it's relative to both the individual scenario and to the universe, then we have situations in which we as 1)members of the universe & 2)individuals compelled by societal norms Should do something, but Can't, either because of physical or existential limitations (things humans can't do but other things in the universe can) or situations with completely equivalent moral content but limitations on our actions, such as encountering two equally worthy homeless people when you only have 1 Money Unit that you can give away, without making yourself destitute.
So, to sum up, Ought still implies Can, but only insofar as SOMETHING Can/we Should Do Both (or All), if we Could. This, of course, doesn't speak completely to a disagreement of definitions, or to the self-sacrificing moralities, but, for a generally applicable, widely-held view on societies morals, I think it works.
And that, my friends is your philosophy wank, for the evening. I promise it won't happen, again, any time soon. I'm really just kind of gladI'm able to still have conversations about Philosophy, at all, without wanting to put my head through a wall.
Thanks to![[livejournal.com profile]](https://www.dreamwidth.org/img/external/lj-userinfo.gif)
mendori & Brandon for being my guinea pigs.
I did this, because I couldn't see a scenario in which what I tell someone they "ought" to do wouldn't be something they "could" do, and have it make any damn sense, and I wanted to see if someone could prove me wrong. So I talked to two people who I knew would have Very different ideas on the question, and got two very different conversations from it.
( Sundays With Mendori )
And, Concurrently:
( Coyote Talk )
So, if you don't want to read all of that: I have seen both that I'm looking at it too narrowly, and that I can make a lateral move.
If the "Ought/Can" relationship is a contextual and compartmental modality, meaning that it's relative to both the individual scenario and to the universe, then we have situations in which we as 1)members of the universe & 2)individuals compelled by societal norms Should do something, but Can't, either because of physical or existential limitations (things humans can't do but other things in the universe can) or situations with completely equivalent moral content but limitations on our actions, such as encountering two equally worthy homeless people when you only have 1 Money Unit that you can give away, without making yourself destitute.
So, to sum up, Ought still implies Can, but only insofar as SOMETHING Can/we Should Do Both (or All), if we Could. This, of course, doesn't speak completely to a disagreement of definitions, or to the self-sacrificing moralities, but, for a generally applicable, widely-held view on societies morals, I think it works.
And that, my friends is your philosophy wank, for the evening. I promise it won't happen, again, any time soon. I'm really just kind of gladI'm able to still have conversations about Philosophy, at all, without wanting to put my head through a wall.
Thanks to
mendori & Brandon for being my guinea pigs.