![[personal profile]](https://www.dreamwidth.org/img/silk/identity/user.png){kind=small}
wolven7Earlier tonight, I put a challenge, various places: Modal moral theorists, I have for you the following challenge: Prove that Ought does not imply Can.
I did this, because I couldn't see a scenario in which what I tell someone they "ought" to do wouldn't be something they "could" do, and have it make any damn sense, and I wanted to see if someone could prove me wrong. So I talked to two people who I knew would have Very different ideas on the question, and got two very different conversations from it.
me: Prove that "ought" doesn't imply "can."
![[livejournal.com profile]](https://www.dreamwidth.org/img/external/lj-userinfo.gif)
mendori: thats simple
deny free will
me: Hmm
mendori: if we could not do other than we did, even if we should have done other, we cant
really, even with modified free will, if there are ANY unfree acts
me: Then you have to Prove that we don't have free will. The proof shifts.
Sent at 5:15 PM on Sunday
me: So... Any unfree acts negate Ought/Can?
mendori: yes
assuming that unfree acts can be morally judged
me: But couldn't we respond, then, that they Can't be?
mendori: which begs you into agency questions
me: and then we are into only judging Free Actions
mendori: which is silly
me: you think? Is there a fundamental breakdown, in that?
mendori: because surely unfree actions carry with them as much moral weight as free ones
if you freely kill someone, or unfreely kill someone, they are still dead
even if you want to deny consequentialism, there still seems to be a problem
me: Then on what basis is Moral weight granted? Because that sounds like a descriptive schema, rather than a moral one
That person is still dead. And?
I could not have done other than I did, in killing them. It is the way of the universe that they are dead
mendori: yet you want to say theres something special about agency that makes their death worse because you caused it freely?
me: Your desire to punish me for it? Same. My desire to make you understand taht that punishment is arbitrary and meaningless? Same
Yes
Sent at 5:20 PM on Sunday
me: If I have a choice in whether to end a life, to negate a spectrum of choice and potential, already enacted, then that is more weighted than if I simply acted in a purely cause and effect scenario, w/o agency
assuming that "agency" is a way of saying that we are movers, ourselves, and not merely moved
mendori: agency means we impose our choises on the world
however those are caused
Sent at 5:23 PM on Sunday
mendori: i dont buy it. i still say, even if we're agents, that causal explanations dont change outcomes, and causal explanations dont change moral value content of our actions
Sent at 5:25 PM on Sunday
me: Then how ARE the moral value contents determined?
mendori: in order to set that up we need a full description of what moral value is, and what moral goods are
me: Right.
mendori: it simply seems clear to me that there are some points in which we should do otherwise, but we cannot
we dont have FULL free will. its against the nature of the universe that we could.
me: Then how "should" we?
mendori: the moral good would dictate something other than what we are capable of
situationally, compositionally, or biologically, or physically
me: This is the problem, for me: "should" seems to be a combination of normative and descriptive values
mendori: it is
Sent at 5:30 PM on Sunday
me: Hence, the very use of it seems to say something about the State of things
mendori: but the state of things encompases more than humans. so if you want to say that there are ANY moral universals, you have to accept that they may in fact sometimes be impossible for humans to complete
me: So, our normative statements then seem predicated on the descriptives
But possible for SOMETHING, in the universe?
mendori: or even for us, at some other junction in situation
me: So, along the Infinite, then?
mendori: yah
Sent at 5:33 PM on Sunday
me: So. Ought DOES imply can... but not necessarily Right Now, or Right Here.
mendori: no
because there are some things humans are incapable of doing
but that other things can do
me: That's what I meant by "right here." Putting "as what you are" in that. So it's a compartmental/contextual modality
mendori: we are limited
all finite beings are limited
yeah
but for most who say should implies can, they mean universally
and situationally
me: So. What if we gain the ability to recombine our constituent matter?
Sent at 5:37 PM on Sunday
mendori: -shrugs-
personality?
upbringing?
me: Is there then any sense in which ought does not imply can? Or are the same limitations in place?
mendori: genetic composition
Got to go
bye
me: Are we still the same thing that we were?
Later
And, Concurrently:
me: Prove that ought does not imply can.
Sent at 5:11 PM on Sunday
Mr: prove that it doesn't?
me: Right
Sent at 5:13 PM on Sunday
Mr: so that, while we would universally agree that we ought to behave in a particular manner, that behavior might in fact, be impossible?
me: Right
Mr: back shortly
sorry
me: Because, the Kantian principle is that if we Ought to do something, it means that we have the Option to do that thing
it's okay
Sent at 5:16 PM on Sunday
Mr: clearly the set "Can" contains the vast but vanishing set of actions available to a hypothetical actor at any moment, limited by physics and the presence of other objects and actors.
the set "Ought" is distinct from the set "Can" because of it's normative nature.
If there is something we ought to do, clearly it implies that there is something else in the set "can" that we ought not to do.
And there are even things beyond Ought and (-)ought
thoe actions which are normatively indifferent
me: See, but to me it seems that Shoulds are combinations of normative and descriptive situations
Mr: bear with me for a moment
me: k
Sent at 5:31 PM on Sunday
Mr: jumping to the punchline
even assuming that all things you ought to do are possible--that ought is a subset of can.
the set can changes from voxel to voxel
one choice precludes other choices
and ought tells us which choice to make
but ought then is bound by the shift in can through time
assume that you have x money
x is all the money you can reasonably expect to need or want in a lifetime
but (x-1) would be insufficient to sustain your life
with me so far?
me: yes
Mr: let's say, while walking down the street you find 1 money
your resources are now (x+1)
you turn a corner and suddenly you're approached by two derelict men . . . twins
each suffering from the same terrible illness
each is at (x-1) for there circumstances
you ought to give your +1 money to each
but you can't give it to both
giving one to both would kill you
so you can only save one
can limits ought
you ought to save both
you can only choose one
so there is something you ought to do, which you can't
the situation is normatively relevant
me: Hmm
Mr: but ought doesn't provide a means for deciding
Sent at 5:39 PM on Sunday
me: I see what you're saying. So, for you, the preclusion of one by the other is how can is no longer implied by ought.
Mr: So when you have identical duties to two persons and there is no means of choosing the primacy among those duties but you cannot fulfill both, ought doens't imply can
yes
me: But: does that still mean that we Actually Ought To? Taking those limitations into account, can we not then Adjust our ought?
Mr: if pushed to satisfy your original condition, at least
Sent at 5:41 PM on Sunday
Mr: you and your twin, who are both at (x-1) happen simultaneously upon 1 money . . .
even if each of you ought to give the money to the other, then you both die
me: Hm. I see.
Mr: adjusting the ought subjects it to the can
it's making an ought from an is
me: I still think that the definition of
"Ought" is violated, but for the standard definition, I see what you mean
Mr: if is drives ought, ought loses normative context
you ought to do what you can
me: Then we ask "why ought we?"
Mr: what we mean is: you ought to do as much as you can, thought there may be more
assuming ought is definable at all
take communism
we ought to give everyone what each needs to sruvive,
survive and be happy
but sir, there isn't enough to satisfy those conditions
who suffers?
assuming you agree on the content of set "ought", when your resources won't satusfy your pre-conceived duty, you ought to do something you can't
but if "ought" is a subset of "can"
I'm wrong
me: Hm
Mr: because we would accept that there is no solution
however, ought loses relevance if it doesn't maintain some independence
because if ought doesn't tell us how to decide, the core choices are arbitrary, assuming that we only ought to do things we can
but if there are things we ought to do but can't
So, if you don't want to read all of that: I have seen both that I'm looking at it too narrowly, and that I can make a lateral move.
If the "Ought/Can" relationship is a contextual and compartmental modality, meaning that it's relative to both the individual scenario and to the universe, then we have situations in which we as 1)members of the universe & 2)individuals compelled by societal norms Should do something, but Can't, either because of physical or existential limitations (things humans can't do but other things in the universe can) or situations with completely equivalent moral content but limitations on our actions, such as encountering two equally worthy homeless people when you only have 1 Money Unit that you can give away, without making yourself destitute.
So, to sum up, Ought still implies Can, but only insofar as SOMETHING Can/we Should Do Both (or All), if we Could. This, of course, doesn't speak completely to a disagreement of definitions, or to the self-sacrificing moralities, but, for a generally applicable, widely-held view on societies morals, I think it works.
And that, my friends is your philosophy wank, for the evening. I promise it won't happen, again, any time soon. I'm really just kind of gladI'm able to still have conversations about Philosophy, at all, without wanting to put my head through a wall.
Thanks tomendori & Brandon for being my guinea pigs.
I did this, because I couldn't see a scenario in which what I tell someone they "ought" to do wouldn't be something they "could" do, and have it make any damn sense, and I wanted to see if someone could prove me wrong. So I talked to two people who I knew would have Very different ideas on the question, and got two very different conversations from it.
me: Prove that "ought" doesn't imply "can."
mendori: thats simpledeny free will
me: Hmm
mendori: if we could not do other than we did, even if we should have done other, we cantreally, even with modified free will, if there are ANY unfree acts
me: Then you have to Prove that we don't have free will. The proof shifts.
Sent at 5:15 PM on Sunday
me: So... Any unfree acts negate Ought/Can?
mendori: yesassuming that unfree acts can be morally judged
me: But couldn't we respond, then, that they Can't be?
mendori: which begs you into agency questionsme: and then we are into only judging Free Actions
mendori: which is sillyme: you think? Is there a fundamental breakdown, in that?
mendori: because surely unfree actions carry with them as much moral weight as free onesif you freely kill someone, or unfreely kill someone, they are still dead
even if you want to deny consequentialism, there still seems to be a problem
me: Then on what basis is Moral weight granted? Because that sounds like a descriptive schema, rather than a moral one
That person is still dead. And?
I could not have done other than I did, in killing them. It is the way of the universe that they are dead
mendori: yet you want to say theres something special about agency that makes their death worse because you caused it freely?me: Your desire to punish me for it? Same. My desire to make you understand taht that punishment is arbitrary and meaningless? Same
Yes
Sent at 5:20 PM on Sunday
me: If I have a choice in whether to end a life, to negate a spectrum of choice and potential, already enacted, then that is more weighted than if I simply acted in a purely cause and effect scenario, w/o agency
assuming that "agency" is a way of saying that we are movers, ourselves, and not merely moved
mendori: agency means we impose our choises on the worldhowever those are caused
Sent at 5:23 PM on Sunday
mendori: i dont buy it. i still say, even if we're agents, that causal explanations dont change outcomes, and causal explanations dont change moral value content of our actionsSent at 5:25 PM on Sunday
me: Then how ARE the moral value contents determined?
mendori: in order to set that up we need a full description of what moral value is, and what moral goods areme: Right.
mendori: it simply seems clear to me that there are some points in which we should do otherwise, but we cannotwe dont have FULL free will. its against the nature of the universe that we could.
me: Then how "should" we?
mendori: the moral good would dictate something other than what we are capable ofsituationally, compositionally, or biologically, or physically
me: This is the problem, for me: "should" seems to be a combination of normative and descriptive values
mendori: it isSent at 5:30 PM on Sunday
me: Hence, the very use of it seems to say something about the State of things
mendori: but the state of things encompases more than humans. so if you want to say that there are ANY moral universals, you have to accept that they may in fact sometimes be impossible for humans to completeme: So, our normative statements then seem predicated on the descriptives
But possible for SOMETHING, in the universe?
mendori: or even for us, at some other junction in situationme: So, along the Infinite, then?
mendori: yahSent at 5:33 PM on Sunday
me: So. Ought DOES imply can... but not necessarily Right Now, or Right Here.
mendori: nobecause there are some things humans are incapable of doing
but that other things can do
me: That's what I meant by "right here." Putting "as what you are" in that. So it's a compartmental/contextual modality
mendori: we are limitedall finite beings are limited
yeah
but for most who say should implies can, they mean universally
and situationally
me: So. What if we gain the ability to recombine our constituent matter?
Sent at 5:37 PM on Sunday
mendori: -shrugs-personality?
upbringing?
me: Is there then any sense in which ought does not imply can? Or are the same limitations in place?
mendori: genetic compositionGot to go
bye
me: Are we still the same thing that we were?
Later
And, Concurrently:
me: Prove that ought does not imply can.
Sent at 5:11 PM on Sunday
Mr: prove that it doesn't?
me: Right
Sent at 5:13 PM on Sunday
Mr: so that, while we would universally agree that we ought to behave in a particular manner, that behavior might in fact, be impossible?
me: Right
Mr: back shortly
sorry
me: Because, the Kantian principle is that if we Ought to do something, it means that we have the Option to do that thing
it's okay
Sent at 5:16 PM on Sunday
Mr: clearly the set "Can" contains the vast but vanishing set of actions available to a hypothetical actor at any moment, limited by physics and the presence of other objects and actors.
the set "Ought" is distinct from the set "Can" because of it's normative nature.
If there is something we ought to do, clearly it implies that there is something else in the set "can" that we ought not to do.
And there are even things beyond Ought and (-)ought
thoe actions which are normatively indifferent
me: See, but to me it seems that Shoulds are combinations of normative and descriptive situations
Mr: bear with me for a moment
me: k
Sent at 5:31 PM on Sunday
Mr: jumping to the punchline
even assuming that all things you ought to do are possible--that ought is a subset of can.
the set can changes from voxel to voxel
one choice precludes other choices
and ought tells us which choice to make
but ought then is bound by the shift in can through time
assume that you have x money
x is all the money you can reasonably expect to need or want in a lifetime
but (x-1) would be insufficient to sustain your life
with me so far?
me: yes
Mr: let's say, while walking down the street you find 1 money
your resources are now (x+1)
you turn a corner and suddenly you're approached by two derelict men . . . twins
each suffering from the same terrible illness
each is at (x-1) for there circumstances
you ought to give your +1 money to each
but you can't give it to both
giving one to both would kill you
so you can only save one
can limits ought
you ought to save both
you can only choose one
so there is something you ought to do, which you can't
the situation is normatively relevant
me: Hmm
Mr: but ought doesn't provide a means for deciding
Sent at 5:39 PM on Sunday
me: I see what you're saying. So, for you, the preclusion of one by the other is how can is no longer implied by ought.
Mr: So when you have identical duties to two persons and there is no means of choosing the primacy among those duties but you cannot fulfill both, ought doens't imply can
yes
me: But: does that still mean that we Actually Ought To? Taking those limitations into account, can we not then Adjust our ought?
Mr: if pushed to satisfy your original condition, at least
Sent at 5:41 PM on Sunday
Mr: you and your twin, who are both at (x-1) happen simultaneously upon 1 money . . .
even if each of you ought to give the money to the other, then you both die
me: Hm. I see.
Mr: adjusting the ought subjects it to the can
it's making an ought from an is
me: I still think that the definition of
"Ought" is violated, but for the standard definition, I see what you mean
Mr: if is drives ought, ought loses normative context
you ought to do what you can
me: Then we ask "why ought we?"
Mr: what we mean is: you ought to do as much as you can, thought there may be more
assuming ought is definable at all
take communism
we ought to give everyone what each needs to sruvive,
survive and be happy
but sir, there isn't enough to satisfy those conditions
who suffers?
assuming you agree on the content of set "ought", when your resources won't satusfy your pre-conceived duty, you ought to do something you can't
but if "ought" is a subset of "can"
I'm wrong
me: Hm
Mr: because we would accept that there is no solution
however, ought loses relevance if it doesn't maintain some independence
because if ought doesn't tell us how to decide, the core choices are arbitrary, assuming that we only ought to do things we can
but if there are things we ought to do but can't
So, if you don't want to read all of that: I have seen both that I'm looking at it too narrowly, and that I can make a lateral move.
If the "Ought/Can" relationship is a contextual and compartmental modality, meaning that it's relative to both the individual scenario and to the universe, then we have situations in which we as 1)members of the universe & 2)individuals compelled by societal norms Should do something, but Can't, either because of physical or existential limitations (things humans can't do but other things in the universe can) or situations with completely equivalent moral content but limitations on our actions, such as encountering two equally worthy homeless people when you only have 1 Money Unit that you can give away, without making yourself destitute.
So, to sum up, Ought still implies Can, but only insofar as SOMETHING Can/we Should Do Both (or All), if we Could. This, of course, doesn't speak completely to a disagreement of definitions, or to the self-sacrificing moralities, but, for a generally applicable, widely-held view on societies morals, I think it works.
And that, my friends is your philosophy wank, for the evening. I promise it won't happen, again, any time soon. I'm really just kind of gladI'm able to still have conversations about Philosophy, at all, without wanting to put my head through a wall.
Thanks to
mendori & Brandon for being my guinea pigs.
