The [in?]fallibility of reason.

[wolven7]

Tom Waits - [Hold On]--- I keep meaning to post this, since I saw it: the question I saw on one of the department whiteboards, yesterday:

"Is reason itself reliable?"

Now, think about that: We laud reason as the thing which separates us from the animals, that makes our decissions worthy, and our thoughts thoughtful. But on what do we base all of this foundation? Reason is the turtle on which our world sits, but is it really turtles, all the way down? Or is that merely what we tell ourselves, so that we can start Somewhere, and "reason" seemed to be a pretty good/consistent place? Then, why do we value consistency, order, in what is obviously a mostly chaotic universe?

Tom Waits - [Get Behind the Mule]--- We have the machinery through which we apprehend the world, and the only thing we have to apprehend the machinery is itself. In any other system, we would dismiss this base circularity, but in knowledge, we not only permit it, but tend to assume its a priori truth.

That's kind of fucked up, really. So ask yourself if you can really value your own opinions, if you value non-circularity, as well. I, however, embrace the paradox. :)

Comments

I like the utilitarian approach

[karishi.livejournal.com]

I figure we set up reason as basis, so we can do stuff.
Nine times out of ten, acceptance of chaos doesn't permit us to do stuff, so we maintain order as our alternative. The rest of the time, we're acting on habit (maintaining order because...it's what we've always done). That practice is not so good (or even reason-based) but is also hard to stop, because it's a practiced practice.

There's a lot of math working off the utility method: "We don't know this, but let's try acting like we did and seeing if something neat happens." I like that. Maintaining it as a priori truth after the fact is where it feels less well-thought.

Re: I like the utilitarian approach

[wolven.livejournal.com]

And that's where I begin to have the problem with it. Yeah, we pretend it's always been true, but, unless we're willing to do it for everything (which I am, and which is why I embrace the paradox), then calling it as having been a priori, forever and ever, amen, seems... Disingenuous.

[nausved.livejournal.com]

I wonder about the scientific method. People forget that it was merely one philosophical approach out of many, but it was the one that won and eventually gave us the sciences.

I still think logic and the scientific method and such are more accurate than the alternatives, though. Take the approach with the best predictive power, I'd say, and that's the one that's most useful (though still not 100% reliable, of course).

Of course, how do you determine which has the best predictive power? Do you use the scientific method to determine that the scientific methods works?

[wolven.livejournal.com]

Yeah, it's the same basic problem, all the way around. Where do we start?

[nausved.livejournal.com]

I want to thank you for posting this. I have been thinking a lot about this over the past few days, and that thinking has come in handy in a somewhat related discussion. It is taken out of context, but this is the comment I wrote on the discussion:

--------------------------------

[In reply to one LJ user's refusal to answer the question, "Why does [valuing others] need to be rational?" because, he claimed, it was a stupid question.]

Actually, I think it is a good question.

Rationality is certainly a useful tool, but it is not entirely ideal, namely in that it ultimately relies on certain assumptions, and those assumptions may be incorrect or irrational themselves. You can rationalize something up to a point--and then you're leaning on limited evidence of one type or another. (The exception would be definitional-type reasoning, such as "all bachelors are unmarried" or "2+2=4", but these have very limited application and really say nothing about the world. This is another discussion altogether, though, and I'll not get into it right now.)

Assuming that survival is good and that death is bad, valuing others--an advanced form altruism presumable common among social mammals--is quite rational. But, still, there is that pesky assumption that your evidence is trustworthy. (And, yes, the assumption that survival is good is based on evidence--namely that virtually all animals behave as if it is good, if you define "good" as that which is liked and wanted and "bad" as that which is disliked and unwanted--though, admittedly, this evidence leaves something to be desired.)

"Why does it need to be rational?" is, to me, an intriguing question for this reason. To ask for reasoning suggests that reason is good. But why is reason good? Because it is reliable? On what basis do we determine that reason is reliable, or that reliability is itself worthwhile?

Ultimately, it all boils down to the desire for survival, and that boils down to genes. Genes are not logical entities. They are merely bits of molecule undergoing meaningless physical processes. Reason is nothing more than a particular pattern of thought known to occur in the human brain; it is by no means universal (as the vast majority of species appear to lack it). Logic is just another evolutionarily-derived trait--as meaningless as the scooting-around of proteins.

You ask for logical explanations for the same non-rational reason that baskcen asks for the betterment of humankind: the proteins make you do it.

--------------------------------

To be honest, I'm not sure I agree entirely with what I've written above. I like arguing points I'm still undecided on, though, as it's a good way to test them out and comb them for flaws.

[wolven.livejournal.com]

I think that avenue has its merits, to be sure, but we can still bring in the idea that now that we have it, and now that we Do want to survive, we should do what allows us to do so, best (even though I don't think that avenue is entirely fruitful).

I think you've looked at it, pretty well, and done something useful with it.

I'm glad I could help :)